

Islamic Political Representation Crisis: Transformation of Orientation and Electoral Base of Islamic Parties After the 2024 Election

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the crisis of Islamic political representation through the transformation of ideological orientation and changes in the electoral base of Islamic parties after the 2024 elections in Indonesia. Although Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, the results of the 2024 election show that Islamic parties have not been able to significantly increase electoral support, and even the United Development Party (PPP) has failed to exceed the parliamentary threshold. This research uses a qualitative method with a *library research approach* sourced from books, journal articles, official documents, and the results of the 2024 election. Data analysis was carried out in a descriptive-analytical manner using *the political cleavage theory* of Lipset and Rokkan, *the catch-all party theory* of Otto Kirchheimer, the dealignment theory of Russell Dalton, and the theory of political representation of Hanna Pitkin. The results of the study show that Islamic parties have undergone a transformation from ideologically oriented parties to more pragmatic and inclusive parties. At the same time, Muslim voters are experiencing a change in increasingly rational political behavior and no longer have strong ideological loyalty to Islamic parties. The pragmatism of the coalition and the weakening of religion-based political divisions have caused the representative identities of Islamic parties to become increasingly blurred. This study found the concept of Post-Islamic Electoral Representation, which is a condition when Islamic identity is maintained as a political symbol, but is no longer the main basis in voter mobilization and party political strategy. These findings show that Islamic politics in Indonesia is not in decline, but is undergoing a transformation towards a more pragmatic and post-ideological political representation.

Keywords : Islamic politics, political representation, Islamic parties, voter behavior, 2024 elections.

Introduction

The development of democracy in post-reform Indonesia has provided ample space for Islamic parties to participate in national political contests. Since the 1999 elections, Islamic parties have been seen as political representations of Muslims who seek to fight for religious aspirations in a democratic system. The presence of parties such as the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the United Development Party (PPP) shows that Islam remains one of the important forces in Indonesia's political dynamics. However, the electoral political journey of Islamic parties does not always show a positive trend. In recent elections, support for Islamic parties has tended to stagnate and even show signs of decline, even though the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim. This condition raises questions about the ability of Islamic parties to represent the political aspirations of Muslims in the midst of increasingly complex social and political changes (Munandar & Suwendi, 2025).

The 2024 election is an important momentum that shows a fundamental change in the configuration of Islamic politics in Indonesia. The election results show that Islamic parties did not experience a significant electoral increase, even the PPP failed to exceed the *parliamentary threshold* of 4 percent so that it did not succeed in obtaining seats in the House of Representatives (DPR). On the other hand, PKB, PKS, and PAN were still able to survive in parliament, but their

votes showed that the electoral base of Islamic parties was increasingly fragmented and no longer dominated by voters who had a strong Islamic ideological orientation. This phenomenon shows the existence of a crisis of Islamic political representation, which is a condition in which Islamic parties have difficulty in maintaining their political identity while failing to consolidate the Muslim voter base effectively (Aclandea et al., 2024a).

The crisis of representation cannot be separated from the change in the political orientation of the Islamic parties themselves. In recent decades, Islamic parties have tended to undergo a transformation from ideologically oriented parties to more pragmatic and inclusive ones. The political orientation that originally emphasized Islamic issues and the aspirations of the ummah has slowly shifted towards more populist issues, such as welfare, economic development, and public services. The transformation was carried out as a strategy to expand the electoral support base in the midst of an increasingly plural and rational society in determining its political choices. However, these changes actually give rise to a new dilemma because the Islamic identity that is the main character of these parties is increasingly blurred and difficult to distinguish from nationalist parties (Susanti & Munandar, 2024).

The change in political orientation is also influenced by the transformation of Muslim voter behavior in Indonesia. Various studies show that religious identity is no longer the main factor in determining

people's political choices. Muslim voters, especially the younger generation, tend to consider factors of leadership, performance, work programs, and welfare issues more than the party's ideological identity. In the perspective of *dealignment* theory, this phenomenon shows the weakening of traditional bonds between voters and parties that have certain ideological closeness. Voters are becoming more pragmatic and no longer have strong political loyalty to Islamic parties (Fitriyah et al., 2025).

In addition, the increase in political personalization and the dominance of figures in electoral contests also affect the position of Islamic parties. The 2024 election shows that voters' preferences are determined more by the figure of the candidate and the popularity of the figure than by the party's identity. This situation results in Islamic parties facing an increasing challenge to maintain their social and electoral base. In fact, some Islamic parties tend to build pragmatic political coalitions by putting aside ideological lines in order to gain access to power. As a result, the ideological differences between Islamic parties and nationalist parties have become thinner and have an impact on the weakening of the representative identity of Islamic parties.

In the perspective of the *catch-all party* theory put forward by Otto Kirchheimer, the transformation shows that Islamic parties have moved from an ideological party model to one oriented towards the expansion of broad voter support. This strategy can indeed increase

political flexibility, but on the other hand it has the potential to reduce the party's ability to maintain its traditional voter identity and loyalty base. Meanwhile, the theory of political representation from Hanna Pitkin explains that a political party is said to be successful in carrying out the function of representation if it is able to fight for the interests, identities, and aspirations of the social groups it represents. In this context, the weakening of the attachment between Islamic parties and the Muslim social base indicates that there is a crisis of representation that needs to be studied more deeply.

Some previous studies have discussed the dynamics of Islamic politics from the aspects of ideology, religious and state relations, and the behavior of Muslim voters in general. However, studies that specifically analyze the crisis of Islamic political representation after the 2024 election, especially in relation to the transformation of party orientation and changes in the electoral base, are still relatively limited. In fact, these changes have important implications for the future of Islamic politics and the configuration of democracy in Indonesia.

Based on these conditions, this study aims to analyze the crisis of Islamic political representation after the 2024 election by focusing on the transformation of the ideological orientation of Islamic parties and changes in the electoral base of Muslim voters in Indonesia. This study is expected to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges and future of Islamic political representation in the

contemporary Indonesian democratic system.

Research Methods

This research uses a qualitative method with a library research approach. This approach was chosen because the research focuses on a conceptual analysis of the crisis of Islamic political representation, the transformation of the ideological orientation of Islamic parties, and changes in the electoral base after the 2024 election. Literature studies allow researchers to examine in depth the dynamics of Islamic politics through various scientific sources, official documents, and previous research results that are relevant to the research theme.

The data sources in this study consist of primary data and secondary data. Primary data were obtained from books, journal articles, and scientific papers that discuss the theory of political representation, Islamic politics, voter behavior, and party systems in Indonesia. The secondary data was obtained from official documents of the General Election Commission (KPU), reports on the results of the 2024 election, surveys of research institutions, and academic and media publications related to the development of Islamic parties in Indonesia.

The data collection technique is carried out through documentation studies and literature review by identifying, classifying, and selecting various sources relevant to the focus of the research. The literature studied includes research on the transformation of Islamic parties, the

behavior of Muslim voters, changes in party ideological orientation, and electoral political dynamics in post-reform Indonesia.

Analisis data dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode deskriptif-analitis melalui tiga tahapan. Pertama, reduksi data, yaitu menyeleksi data yang relevan dengan fokus penelitian. Kedua, kategorisasi data, yakni mengelompokkan data ke dalam beberapa tema, seperti krisis representasi politik Islam, transformasi orientasi partai, dan perubahan basis elektoral pemilih Muslim. Ketiga, interpretasi data, yaitu menafsirkan temuan penelitian dengan menggunakan teori *political cleavage* dari Lipset dan Rokkan, teori *catch-all party* dari Otto Kirchheimer, teori *dealignment* pemilih dari Russell J. Dalton, serta teori representasi politik dari Hanna Pitkin untuk menjelaskan perubahan posisi dan strategi politik partai-partai Islam pasca Pemilu 2024.

To ensure the validity of the data, this study uses source triangulation, which is comparing information obtained from various books, scientific articles, official documents, and previous research results. Through this approach, this study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the crisis of Islamic political representation and the transformation of the electoral base of Islamic parties in the context of contemporary Indonesian democracy.

As a literature-based research, this study has limitations because it does not involve direct field data collection.

Therefore, the findings of this study are more directed to build an analytical framework regarding the changing representation of Islamic politics and provide a conceptual basis for future empirical research.

Result and Discussion

The Crisis of Islamic Political Representation After the 2024 Election

The results of the 2024 election show that Islamic parties in Indonesia face serious challenges in maintaining their position as political representatives of Muslims. Although Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, the electoral achievements of Islamic parties have not shown a significant increase. In fact, the failure of the United Development Party (PPP) to exceed the *parliamentary threshold* of 4 percent is a strong indication that Islamic identity is no longer the main factor in determining people's political preferences. At the same time, other Islamic parties such as the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the National Mandate Party (PAN) did remain in parliament, but their vote gains showed stagnation and an inability to consolidate the political support of Muslims more broadly.

This phenomenon shows the existence of a crisis of Islamic political representation, which is a condition when Islamic parties have difficulty in articulating, aggregating, and fighting for the political aspirations of Muslim voters effectively. In the perspective of Hanna

Pitkin (1967), political representation is not only interpreted as the presence of representatives in political institutions (*descriptive representation*), but also includes the ability of representatives to act and fight for the interests of the group they represent (*substantive representation*). Thus, the success of Islamic parties cannot be measured solely by the number of seats won in parliament, but also by the extent to which they are able to become channels for the political aspirations of Muslims.

In the context of Indonesia after the 2024 elections, the relationship between Islamic parties and the Muslim social base shows a significant weakening symptom. Muslim groups that were previously the traditional base of Islamic parties, such as student communities, Islamic boarding school networks, and religious organizations, no longer provide solid support to Islamic parties. Some Muslim voters instead distribute their votes to nationalist parties that are considered better able to offer welfare programs, strong leadership, and access to power. This condition shows the existence of a *representation gap*, which is the gap between the party elite and the social groups that have been the basis of its constituents.

The crisis of representation does not appear suddenly, but is an accumulation of various social and political changes that have taken place in recent decades. Modernization, urbanization, increasing education levels, and the development of information technology have changed the political orientation of the Indonesian

Muslim community. If in the past religious identity was one of the main determinants in voting behavior, then in the era of contemporary democracy voters tend to be more rational and pragmatic in determining their political choices.

These changes can be explained through the dealignment theory put forward by Russell Dalton. According to Dalton, modern society has weakened ideological and emotional ties to political parties. Voters no longer have strong political loyalty to a particular party, but rather consider practical issues, such as economic conditions, government performance, leadership quality, and the effectiveness of public policies (Dalton, 2013). In the Indonesian context, this phenomenon causes Islamic identity to no longer be a strong enough factor to guarantee electoral support for Islamic parties.

In addition, changes in the social structure of the Indonesian Muslim community have also resulted in a transformation in the pattern of political identification. The Muslim middle-class groups that grew post-reform tended to have a more fluid political orientation and were no longer tied to religious-based political affiliations. They prioritize issues such as the eradication of corruption, economic welfare, employment, and the quality of public services. As a result, Islamic parties have lost their comparative advantage as the exclusive representation of the political interests of Muslims (Al Qurtuby, 2020).

In the perspective of the *theory of political cleavage* put forward by Lipset and Rokkan, this phenomenon shows the weakening of the *dividing line* between Islamic and nationalist groups in the Indonesian party system. In the early days of reform, religious identity was still an important factor that differentiated the political orientation of the people. However, the development of democracy shows that religion-based political divisions are weakening and are being replaced by new divisions based on issues of welfare, political personalization, and government performance (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967).

The crisis of Islamic political representation is also influenced by the internal transformation of the Islamic parties themselves. In recent decades, Islamic parties have tended to abandon a strong ideological orientation and move towards a more pragmatic political strategy. They no longer put Islamic issues at the top of the agenda, but rather highlight universal issues that are acceptable to a wider group of voters. This strategy does provide an opportunity to expand the support base, but at the same time it also obscures the political identity of Islam that has been the main character of these parties.

Otto Kirchheimer explained that modern political parties tend to transform into *catch-all parties*, which are parties that seek to attract support from various social groups by reducing the emphasis on certain ideological identities (Kirchheimer, 1966). In the context of Islamic parties in

Indonesia, the transformation towards a *catch-all party* produces a serious dilemma. On the one hand, political pragmatism is needed to win electoral competitions. However, on the other hand, this strategy actually weakens the party's representative identity and reduces the loyalty of its traditional voters.

The crisis of representation is also strengthened by the increasing phenomenon of personalization of *politics*. The 2024 election shows that voter behavior is increasingly influenced by figures and popularity rather than party identities. People tend to choose candidates who are considered to have leadership capacity, emotional closeness, and the ability to solve public problems. In this situation, political parties, including Islamic parties, are increasingly losing their representative functions and are more of a political vehicle for certain figures.

On the other hand, the development of social media and political digitalization has also changed the pattern of political mobilization of Muslims. Social media creates a new public space that allows people to obtain political information from various sources without having to go through party institutions. Political and religious authorities became increasingly fragmented, so that Islamic parties were no longer the only channel for articulating the aspirations of the ummah. Various socio-religious movements, digital communities, and Muslim figures on social media now have a greater influence in shaping public political opinion than formal political organizations (Muhammad & Irwan, 2023).

Thus, the crisis of Islamic political representation after the 2024 election not only shows a decline in electoral support for Islamic parties, but also reflects a more fundamental transformation in the relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia. Islamic parties face a major challenge in redefining their political positions and functions amid changes in social structure, weakening of religious-based political identities, and increasing voter pragmatism and political personalization.

Therefore, the future of Islamic politics in Indonesia is largely determined by the ability of Islamic parties to carry out substantive political repositioning. They are not enough to rely only on Islamic symbols and identities, but need to present a political agenda that is able to answer the needs of contemporary society without losing its ideological character as a political representation of Muslims. If it fails to carry out this transformation, then the representation crisis that occurs after the 2024 election has the potential to further weaken the position of Islamic politics in Indonesia's democratic system.

Transformation of the Ideological Orientation of Islamic Parties

Changes in voter behavior and post-reform democratic dynamics have encouraged Islamic parties in Indonesia to significantly transform their political orientation. If at the beginning of the

reform era Islamic parties emphasized the ideological agenda and symbols of Islam as the main political identity, then in the last two decades they have tended to adopt a more pragmatic, inclusive, and universal issue-oriented political strategy. These changes not only reflect efforts to adapt to changing voter preferences, but also show a paradigm shift in Islamic political practice in Indonesia (Aclandea et al., 2024).

At the beginning of the reforms, Islamic parties emerged with a fairly clear agenda regarding the relationship between Islam and the state. The United Development Party (PPP) maintains its identity as an Islamic party rooted in the aspirations of the people, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) appears with the spirit of da'wah and political morality, while the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB) carry moderate Islamic ideas based on the traditions of major Islamic organizations, namely Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. In this period, Islamic identity became the main differentiator that distinguished Islamic parties from nationalist parties.

However, along with the consolidation of Indonesian democracy, the ideological orientation of Islamic parties has undergone quite fundamental changes. Ideological agendas, such as the formal implementation of Islamic law, the strengthening of the political identity of the ummah, and the symbolization of Islam in public policy, are slowly starting to be abandoned. On the contrary, Islamic parties are increasingly carrying out universal

issues, such as economic development, social welfare, education, governance, corruption eradication, and strengthening democracy.

This transformation shows that Islamic parties no longer place Islam as a formal political agenda, but rather make Islamic values a source of ethics and inspiration in formulating public policies. In practice, this approach makes the ideological boundaries between Islamic parties and nationalist parties increasingly blurred. The programs offered by Islamic parties are no longer significantly different from those carried out by non-Islamic parties, so that Islamic political identity is increasingly losing its distinguishing power in electoral competitions.

This phenomenon can be explained through the catch-all party theory put forward by Otto Kirchheimer. According to Kirchheimer, the development of modern democracy has encouraged political parties to reduce ideological exclusivity and expand their support base to more heterogeneous groups of voters. In conditions of increasingly fierce electoral competition, political parties can no longer rely on traditional social bases, but must be able to reach out to various groups of people with diverse political interests and preferences (Kirchheimer, 1966).

In the Indonesian context, the transformation towards a *catch-all party* is a rational response to changing Muslim voter behavior. Indonesian voters, especially the younger generation and the Muslim middle class, no longer make

religious identity the main factor in determining political choices. They consider more leadership factors, welfare programs, government performance, and the party's ability to answer economic and social problems. This condition forces Islamic parties to carry out ideological moderation in order to remain competitive in the arena of electoral democracy.

However, this transformation also brings consequences that are not simple. The more pragmatic the political orientation of Islamic parties, the more difficult it is for people to distinguish their political character from nationalist parties. As a result, Islamic parties experience what Panebianco calls an organizational identity crisis, which is a condition when a party loses the ideological characteristics that have been the source of its legitimacy and political differentiation (Panebianco, 1988).

This condition is clearly seen in the behavior of the coalition of Islamic parties during the last few elections. Islamic parties show great flexibility in determining the direction of political coalitions, often even in coalitions with political forces that have different ideological orientations. These political choices show that access to power and electoral interests are more dominant than efforts to maintain ideological consistency. On the one hand, this pragmatism increases the chances of Islamic parties to be involved in government. However, on the other hand, it weakens the public perception that Islamic parties are a different political representation.

Furthermore, the transformation of the ideological orientation of Islamic parties also shows the de-ideologizing process of Islamic politics. According to Roy, deideologisation occurs when Islamic movements or parties gradually abandon the ideological agenda and adapt to the demands of practical politics and the mechanisms of modern democracy (Roy, 1994). In the Indonesian context, this phenomenon is reflected in the decreasing use of Islamic ideological issues in political campaigns and the increasingly dominant pragmatic issues that are universal.

This transformation ultimately resulted in a profound dilemma for Islamic parties. On the one hand, they must maintain their Islamic identity as the basis of historical and symbolic legitimacy. This identity remains important because it is a source of loyalty for some traditional voters and distinguishes them from nationalist parties. However, on the other hand, Islamic parties are also required to expand their support base through more inclusive and pragmatic political strategies in order to remain competitive in an increasingly open democratic system.

This dilemma shows that Islamic parties are at a crossroads between identity politics and pragmatic politics. If their ideological identity is too prominent, they risk losing moderate voters and young voters who tend to be pragmatic. On the other hand, if they put too much emphasis on political pragmatism, they lose the representative identity and traditional social base that has been their main strength.

Thus, the transformation of the ideological orientation of Islamic parties after the 2024 election cannot be understood simply as an electoral strategy, but is a manifestation of a more fundamental change in the relationship between Islam, democracy, and party politics in Indonesia. The shift from *ideological parties* to *catch-all parties* has allowed Islamic parties to survive in the competition of modern democracy, but at the same time it has also deepened the crisis of Islamic political representation by further obscuring the identity and representative functions of Islamic parties as channels for the political aspirations of Muslims.

Shifting Electoral Base and Changing Muslim Voter Behavior

One of the most important transformations in Indonesian Islamic politics after the 2024 election is the shift in the electoral base and changes in the behavior of Muslim voters. For decades, Islamic parties have enjoyed relatively stable support from student groups, Islamic boarding schools, religious organizations, and communities that have a strong identification with Islamic political symbols. This social base is the main capital that distinguishes Islamic parties from nationalist parties. However, social, economic, and political developments in the last two decades show that the electoral base is increasingly fragmented and no longer a solid source of political support for Islamic parties (Nastain et al., 2025).

This phenomenon shows that the relationship between religious identity and voting behavior has undergone a fairly fundamental change. If at the beginning of the reform era religious affiliation was still one of the main determinants in people's political choices, then today Islamic identity no longer has as strong political mobilization power as before. Muslim voters are increasingly showing pragmatic, rational and flexible character in determining their political preferences. This condition indicates a change in social and political structure that affects the pattern of relations between Islamic parties and their constituents.

In the perspective of the *theory of dealignment* put forward by Russell Dalton, modern society tends to experience a weakening of ideological and emotional ties with political parties. Voters no longer have strong political loyalty to a particular party, but rather consider pragmatic factors, such as government performance, economic conditions, leadership quality, and the effectiveness of public policies. In the Indonesian context, the theory explains why Muslim voters no longer automatically give support to Islamic parties simply because of the similarity of religious identity (Dalton, 2013).

The weakening of religion-based political identification is also influenced by the modernization process and the increasing level of public education. Modernization has given birth to a Muslim middle-class group that has a more rational and open political orientation. This group tends to place issues of welfare, economic

stability, job opportunities, and the quality of public services as the main considerations in determining political choices. As a result, religious identity is no longer the sole factor determining electoral preferences (Alam, 2018).

In the perspective of the theory of *post-materialism* put forward by Ronald Inglehart, the increase in welfare and education caused society to experience a change in political values. Voters are no longer just considering primordial identities, but are beginning to pay attention to more substantive issues, such as governance, transparency, civil rights, and the effectiveness of public policy. This phenomenon can be seen in the majority of urban Muslim voters who tend to be more rational and no longer have strong ideological ties with Islamic parties (Inglehart, 1997).

The change in voter behavior is increasingly visible in the younger generation of Muslims. The young generation is the largest group of voters in the 2024 election and has different political characteristics compared to the previous generation. They grew up in a more open democratic environment, had broad access to digital technology, and were more accustomed to the rapid and diverse flow of information. As a result, their political orientation is no longer based on ideological loyalty, but rather on the assessment of figures, programs, and issues that are considered relevant to their lives.

Surveys show that young people are more interested in issues such as

employment, economic growth, education, the cost of living, and social mobility opportunities than ideological or symbolic issues. They also tend to judge political parties based on their ability to offer concrete solutions to everyday problems. In this context, Islamic parties face a major challenge because the political agenda they carry often does not have a strong enough differentiation compared to nationalist parties.

In addition, the development of social media and political digitalization has changed the pattern of political socialization of the Muslim community. If in the past the political orientation of the community was influenced by scholars, religious leaders, and religious organizations, then now social media has become the main arena in the formation of political opinions. Political information is no longer monopolized by a particular party or organization, but is produced and disseminated by various actors through digital platforms.

According to Castells, contemporary society has entered the era of a *network society*, which is a society whose social and political relations are increasingly shaped by digital information networks. In a networked society, the process of forming political preferences becomes more fluid and no longer relies on traditional social structures. As a consequence, Islamic parties have lost some of their ability to control and maintain their traditional electoral base (Castells, 2010).

The development of social media has also encouraged the increase in personalization of politics. Voters are increasingly influenced by personal figures and images rather than party identities. This condition causes loyalty to political parties to weaken and is replaced by support for certain figures who are considered to have leadership capacity, emotional closeness, and the ability to solve public problems.

As a result of these changes, Muslim voters have become increasingly fluid (*floating voters*). They no longer consider Islamic parties as the only channel of political representation of the ummah. In fact, most Muslim voters have no objection to supporting nationalist parties as long as they are deemed to be able to provide greater political and economic benefits. In other words, religious identity has lost most of its capacity as an effective instrument of political mobilization.

In the perspective of the *political cleavage* theory of Lipset and Rokkan, this phenomenon shows the weakening of religion-based political divisions in the Indonesian party system. In the past, the division between Islamic and nationalist groups became one of the main foundations of political competition. However, the development of democracy shows that these divisions are increasingly eroding and replaced by new, more pragmatic issues, such as welfare, leadership, and the effectiveness of government.

However, this does not mean that religious identity has completely lost its

influence in Indonesian politics. Religion-based identity politics still has a certain relevance, especially at certain political moments and in the context of mobilizing issues related to the interests of the people. However, this influence is no longer strong enough to guarantee automatic electoral victory for Islamic parties.

Thus, the shift in the electoral base and the change in the behavior of Muslim voters show that Islamic politics in Indonesia is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Muslim voters are becoming increasingly rational, pragmatic, and no longer have strong ideological loyalty to Islamic parties. This has caused Islamic parties to lose the traditional support base that has been the source of their political power and at the same time face the great challenge of rebuilding a strategy of political representation that is more relevant to the character of contemporary Muslim voters.

Coalition Politics and the Dilemma of Islamic Party Identity

Changes in political orientation and shifts in the electoral base not only affect the campaign strategies of Islamic parties, but also encourage a transformation in the pattern of political coalitions they build. In recent elections, Islamist parties have shown a high degree of flexibility in determining the direction of coalitions, often even forging political cooperation with parties with different ideological orientations. This phenomenon shows that coalition politics in Indonesia is increasingly based on pragmatic

calculations and electoral interests rather than ideological considerations.

In the early days of reform, political coalitions based on religious identity still had a strong relevance. Islamic parties tend to build alliances with fellow Islamic parties or at least consider ideological closeness in determining their political partners. However, the development of electoral democracy shows that this pattern has undergone significant changes. Islamic parties are now more open to building coalitions with various political forces without paying close attention to ideological similarities. The coalition's main orientation no longer lies in fighting for the Islamic political agenda collectively, but rather in how to gain access to power and maintain a strategic position in government.

In the perspective of the office-seeking party theory put forward by William Riker, political parties basically act rationally to gain and maintain power. Therefore, coalition formation is based more on the calculation of political gain than ideological considerations. In the Indonesian context, the theory explains why Islamic parties tend to put aside ideological differences and choose to join coalitions that provide greater opportunities for political action (Riker, 1962).

The coalition's pragmatism is evident in various political configurations after the reform. Islamic parties can be in the same coalition as nationalist parties in one period, then move to a different coalition in the next. This kind of flexibility suggests

that ideological identity is no longer the primary foundation in the formation of political alliances. As a result, it is increasingly difficult for people to distinguish the political positions of Islamic parties from non-Islamic parties.

In the perspective of the *theory of political cleavage* put forward by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), this condition indicates a weakening of the political *cleavage* between Islamic groups and nationalist groups in the Indonesian party system. In the past, the dividing line between the two groups became one of the main foundations of political competition. However, the development of democracy and the increase in political pragmatism have caused these ideological divisions to fade away.

The weakening of *religion-based cleavage* also suggests that Islamic political identities no longer have a strong mobilization capacity. Islamic parties are no longer perceived as exclusive representations of the political interests of Muslims, but rather as part of mainstream *political parties* oriented towards power competition. In this context, Islam is more often used as a symbol of political identity than as an ideological framework that determines the direction and strategy of the party's struggle.

This condition gives birth to a quite deep dilemma for Islamic parties. On the one hand, coalition pragmatism is needed to maintain political existence and gain access to power resources. In a multiparty presidential system like Indonesia, the

ability to build a coalition is an important condition for the political sustainability of the party. Parties that are unable to adapt to coalition dynamics risk political marginalization and loss of influence in the policy-making process.

However, on the other hand, excessive pragmatism has the potential to weaken the ideological identity of Islamic parties. When Islamic parties are too easy to switch coalitions and forge alliances with various political forces without regard for ideological consistency, people begin to question their commitment to the Islamic political agenda. As a result, Islamic parties faced a crisis of trust and lost their appeal as a political representation of the ummah.

This phenomenon is in line with the view of Panebianco (1988) who stated that political parties can experience an identity crisis when the orientation of the organization is increasingly dominated by pragmatic interests and increasingly moves away from the ideological values that are the basis of its initial legitimacy. In the context of Islamic parties in Indonesia, coalition pragmatism has led to a weakening of representative identity and a reduction in the party's ability to build the political loyalty of Muslim voters.

Furthermore, this condition strengthens the argument that Islamic politics in Indonesia is undergoing a post-Islamic electoral representation process. This concept refers to a situation in which Islamic identity is maintained as a political symbol, but is no longer the main basis in voter mobilization or in the formation of

political strategies. Islam is still used as a source of symbolic legitimacy and historical identity, but the political practices it carries out are increasingly pragmatic, inclusive, and oriented towards power struggles.

The concept of *post-Islamic electoral representation* is close to the idea of post-Islamism put forward by Asef Bayat (2007), which is a condition when Islamic actors begin to combine religious identity with the values of democracy, pluralism, and political pragmatism. In the Indonesian context, this phenomenon is reflected in the tendency of Islamic parties to no longer make the Islamic ideological agenda the main orientation, but rather prioritize universal issues that are acceptable to a wider group of voters.

Thus, coalition politics and electoral pragmatism have resulted in a profound transformation in Indonesian Islamic politics. Islamic parties no longer function as the exclusive channels of the political aspirations of the ummah, but have turned into political actors that move within the competitive logic of modern democracy. The change explains why the crisis of Islamic political representation after the 2024 election is not only related to the decline in electoral support, but also to the change in the identity, orientation, and representative function of Islamic parties in the Indonesian political system.

Based on the results of the analysis, this study found three fundamental changes in Islamic politics after the 2024 election. First, there has been a

transformation in the orientation of Islamic parties from ideological parties to a *catch-all party* that is more pragmatic and inclusive. Second, there has been a shift in the electoral base, in which Muslim voters have become increasingly rational, fluid, and no longer have strong ideological loyalty to Islamic parties. Third, there is a weakening of the representative identity of Islamic parties, which is characterized by coalition pragmatism and the increasingly blurred ideological differences between Islamic parties and nationalist parties.

These three changes lead to the concept of Post-Islamic Electoral Representation, which is a condition in which Islamic parties maintain their Islamic identity as a political symbol and source of historical legitimacy, but their orientation, strategy, and electoral base are increasingly moving towards pragmatic and post-ideological politics. In this condition, Islamic political representation is no longer built through the mobilization of religious identity alone, but through the ability of Islamic parties to respond to the demands of democracy, social change, and increasingly rational and plural voter preferences.

Conclusion and Recommendation

This study concludes that Islamic parties in Indonesia after the 2024 election are facing a crisis of political representation marked by three main changes, namely the transformation of ideological orientation,

the shift of the electoral base, and the weakening of the representative identity of Islamic parties. Islamic parties are increasingly moving from *the ideological party* model to a *more pragmatic and inclusive catch-all party*, prioritizing universal issues such as welfare, economic development, and governance rather than an ideological Islamic political agenda. At the same time, Muslim voters are experiencing a change in increasingly rational and pragmatic political behavior so that religious identity is no longer the dominant factor in making political choices. This condition is strengthened by the coalition's pragmatism which causes the ideological boundary between Islamic parties and nationalist parties to blur even more.

The findings of this study lead to the concept of Post-Islamic Electoral Representation, which is a condition when Islamic identity is maintained as a political symbol and a source of historical legitimacy, but is no longer the main basis in voter mobilization and party political strategy. Islamic politics in Indonesia has not undergone a setback, but has undergone a transformation towards a more pragmatic, inclusive form of representation, and adapting to the dynamics of contemporary democracy. Therefore, the future of Islamic parties is largely determined by their ability to reconstruct political identities and formulate substantive agendas that are able to respond to the needs of modern society without losing their representative

character as a channel for the political aspirations of Muslims.

This study recommends that Islamic parties carry out political repositioning through the strengthening of ideological identities that are more substantive and contextual, rather than merely symbolic, by emphasizing issues of social justice, welfare, good governance, and community empowerment as manifestations of Islamic values in public policy. In addition, Islamic parties need to develop political strategies that are adaptive to changing voter behavior, especially the younger generation of Muslims, through strengthening digital political communication and strengthening the regeneration base. The next research is suggested to use an empirical approach through in-depth surveys or interviews to analyze in more detail the factors influencing changes in Muslim voter behavior and the prospects for Islamic political representation in Indonesian democracy after the 2024 elections.

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